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Abstract 
This paper uses a new cross-country cross-industry dataset on investment in tangible and 
intangible assets for 18 European countries and the US.  We set out a framework for 
measuring intangible investment and capital stocks and their effect on output, inputs and 
total factor productivity. The analysis provides evidence on the diffusion of intangible 
investment across Europe and the US over the years 2000-2013 and offers growth 
accounting evidence before and after the Great Recession in 2008-2009. Our major 
findings are the following. First, tangible investment fell massively during the Great 
Recession and has hardly recovered, whereas intangible investment has been relatively 
resilient and recovered fast in the US but lagged behind in the EU. Second, the sources 
of growth analysis including only national account intangibles (software, R&D, mineral 
exploration and artistic originals), suggest that capital deepening is the main driver of 
growth, with tangibles and intangibles accounting for 80% and 20% in the EU while both 
account for 50% in the US, over 2000-2013. Extending the asset boundary to the 
intangible assets not included in the national accounts (Corrado, Hulten and Sichel 
(2005)) makes capital deepening increases. The contribution of tangibles is reduced both 
in the EU and the US (60% and 40% respectively) while intangibles account for a larger 
share (40% in EU and 60% in the US). Then, our analysis shows that since the Great 
Recession, the slowdown in labour productivity growth has been driven by a decline in 
TFP growth with relatively a minor role for tangible and intangible capital. Finally, we 
document a significant correlation between stricter employment protection rules and less 
government investment in R&D, and a lower ratio of intangible to tangible investment. 
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1 Introduction 
The changing nature of the global economy has placed novel attention on intangible 
capital as a new source of growth. Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, hereafter CHS) 
expanded the core concept of business investment in national accounts by treating much 
business spending on “intangibles” – computerised databases, R&D, design, brand 
equity, firm-specific training, and organisational efficiency – as investment1. 
When this expanded view of investment is included in a sources-of-growth analysis, 
intangible capital is found to account for one-fifth to one-third of labour productivity 
growth in the market sector of advanced economies. 
As overall business intangible investment is large and growing in advanced countries 
(Corrado et al., 2013) the development of harmonised methods and measures of 
intangible capital coherent with national accounting practices is essential for a deeper 
understanding of the sources of growth and for the design of macroeconomic policies 
aimed at stimulating sustained growth, competitiveness and sustainable development. 
Although the fixed asset boundary in national accounts has been continuously expanded 
in recent decades to better account for the role of intangibles, official estimates treat as 
investment only a limited range of intangible assets: R&D, mineral exploration, computer 
software and databases, and entertainment, literary and artistic originals (SNA 2008/ESA 
2010). 
Following the work of Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, 2009) and Nakamura (1999, 
2001) a significant research effort has expanded the number of countries for which 
estimates of investment in intangible assets based on the CHS approach are available. 
Much work on intangibles focused on Europe and is comparative in nature. This applies 
to two projects funded by the European Commission (COINVEST and INNODRIVE) 
under the 7th Framework Programme and to work conducted by The Conference Board 
and published by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in December 2009. These projects 
generated estimates of business intangible investment and capital for the European 
economies. More recently, great efforts have been devoted to producing harmonised 
national estimates. This has led to the publication of the INTAN-Invest dataset2, which 
                                                 
1 The seminal contribution of Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2009, hereafter CHS) was to use an economic 
view of investment to formalise the arguments for capitalising a broad range of intangibles (not just R&D and 
software) in company and national accounts. Such assets are created when today’s resources are set aside and 
used to expand tomorrow’s production capacity.  The criterion applies equally to firms’ expenditures on product, 
market and organisational development because firms expend resources on such activities to increase their 
future production capacity through “organic growth”, or innovation. This view of investment is common sense, 
yet it is firmly grounded in economic theory via the optimal growth literature (e.g. Weitzman 1976; see also 
Hulten 1979). 
 
2 “Harmonised” means that, to the extent possible, the same concepts, methods, and data sources are 
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covered 27 countries of the European Union, plus Norway and the United States (Corrado 
et al., 2012). 
This paper uses a newly revised and updated release of the INTAN-Invest dataset for the 
market sector (INTAN-Invest 2016) of 18 European countries and the US to analyse the 
diffusion of intangible investment within Europe and in the US, to investigate the role of 
intangible capital as a source of growth and to improve our understanding of the drivers 
of the intangible investment gaps across countries. 
The paper is structured into seven sections. Section 2 illustrates the theoretical framework 
and section 3 provides a data description (INTAN-Invest dataset, 2016). Section 4 
illustrates the distribution and trends of intangible investment in the US and in the 
European economies over the years 2000 to 2013. Section 5 provides evidence about the 
economic relevance of intangible investment while section 6 explores the drivers of 
intangible capital accumulation. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 The theoretical framework  
CHS advanced a simple three-sector model that specified production functions for 
consumer goods, conventional investment goods, and intangibles. The model was used 
to show how an economy’s input and output growth changed when business investment 
in intangibles was capitalised, and its variables were used to identify the prices and 
quantities that needed to be measured in order to capitalise intangibles and study their 
contribution to growth. 
Here we follow the same strategy but use the related model by Corrado, Goodridge and 
Haskel (2011) that integrates the various approaches to innovation and integrates 
innovation into the national accounts to make it measurable (see also Corrado et al., 
2013). 
The main assumptions of the model are the following. Knowledge (ideas) is an input 
needed to produce consumption and tangible investment goods together with labour and 
tangible capital. There exist two types of knowledge. One is knowledge that is generated 
without using factors of production and that is freely available to firms (free knowledge). 
The other is knowledge that is produced using inputs and that firms must pay for to use 
in their production process (commercialised knowledge). Commercialised knowledge is 
accumulated over time, generating the stock of commercial knowledge via the standard 
perpetual inventory relation and with its own user cost (explicit or implicit).3  
                                                 
applied and used for each country. 
3 To be more precise, the model considers a simplified economy with just two industries/sectors. The innovation 
sector produces new finished ideas i.e. it commercialises knowledge (e.g. a way of organising production, or a 
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The first implication of the model is a broad definition of investment, which includes 
expenditure to purchase both tangible goods and commercialised knowledge, and a broad 
definition of aggregate output, which includes not only consumption goods and tangible 
investment goods but also commercialised knowledge.  
 
PQQ = PYY + PNN = PCC + PII + PNN      [1] 
 
The reason can be thought of by analogy to tangible investment. Suppose an aircraft 
factory buys in aluminium and produces both final output and its own machines. Then 
its value added should be properly treated as both the final aeroplanes and the machines, 
i.e. one might think of the factory as consisting of both an aircraft factory and also a 
machine factory. Its investment should be treated as the equal to the output of the 
machines. Now suppose the factory also writes its own long-lived software to run the 
machines. Then we should think of it as both an aircraft factory and machine factory and 
also a software factory and its investment should include not only the machines but also 
the software that is produced. 
The second implication is that the expression for the sources of growth in value added 
output is,  
 
𝑑lnQ = 𝑠𝑄
𝐿𝑑𝑙𝑛𝐿 + 𝑠𝑄
𝐾𝑑𝑙𝑛𝐾 + 𝑠𝑄
𝑅𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑅 + 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑃     [2] 
 
where sQ is the share of nominal value added accounted for by payments to the particular 
factor, dlnTFP is defined as the growth in Q (extended output including commercialised 
knowledge) over and above the growth contributions of labour, the accumulated stock of 
tangible capital and the accumulated stock of commercialised knowledge (which are in 
turn their growth rates, times their factor payment shares in total value added). 
The final implication is that the model provides a measure of innovation. Equation 2 says 
that value added growth is due in part to growth in L and K. This formalises the idea that 
growth can be achieved by duplication i.e. adding more labour and tangible capital. It 
further says that growth can be due to the increased use of paid-for ideas, dlnR, but they 
                                                 
working software programme adapted to the needs of the organisation, say that implements pay and pension 
calculations for many part-time workers), while the “production” sector uses the knowledge to produce 
consumption and tangible investment goods. The innovation sector can, at least for some period, appropriate 
returns to its knowledge, and so this model is identical to Romer (1990) (where patent-protected knowledge is 
sold at a monopoly price to the final output sector during the period of appropriability), while the production 
sector is price taker for commercialised knowledge. Both sectors are price takers for labour and tangible capital. 
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have to be paid for to be used, and hence make a contribution to dlnQ of sQ
RdlnR. The 
final term, dlnTFP is the growth impact of everything else, which in this model can only 
be free ideas used in both sectors. Thus in this model, innovation in the sense of use of 
ideas is also growth net of K and L usage, i.e. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑠𝑄
𝑅𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑅 + 𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑃 = 𝑑lnQ − (𝑠𝑄
𝐿𝑑𝑙𝑛𝐿 + 𝑠𝑄
𝐾𝑑𝑙𝑛𝐾)  [3] 
 
Many innovation studies have attempted to distinguish between innovation and diffusion, 
the latter being the spread of new ideas. If the ideas come for free, they are, in this 
framework, counted in TFP growth. So the part of innovation measured by sQ
RdlnR is 
investment in commercialised new ideas and that part measured by dlnTFP might be 
regarded as the diffusion of free ideas. 
 
3 Implementation: choice of assets and data sources  
3.1 Choice of assets 
What then are intangible assets?  They are investments that enable knowledge to be 
commercialised. CHS group them into three categories (see Table 1 below) 
 
 
Table 1: CHS intangible assets, national accounts conventions 
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Asset
Intang included in Nat 
Accounts?
Capitalization 
Factor Depreciation rate
Computerised Information
Purchased Software Yes 1 0.315
Own-Account Software Yes 1 0.315
Databases See note 1 0.315
Innovative property
R&D Yes 1 0.15
Design No 0.5 0.2
Mineral Exploration Yes 1 0.075
Financial Innovation No 1 0.2
Artistic originals Yes asset-specific asset-specific
Economic Competencies
Advertising No 0.6 0.55
Marketing research No 0.6 0.55
Own-Account Organisational Capital No 1 0.4
Purchased Organisational Capital No 0.8 0.4
Training No 1 0.4
 
Let us review the assets in Table 1. “Computerised information” includes both purchased and 
own-account software: note that many intangibles are likely to be generated “in-house”.  
Databases are also included as recommended in SNA 2008.   
The second and third broad groups are “innovative property” and “economic competencies”.  
“Innovative Property” is designed to capture a range of assets that may have intellectual property 
protection associated with them, e.g. R&D, design and artistic originals. Given the huge interest 
at the time in financial services the CHS list included a special category for them. “Economic 
competencies” aim at capturing a range of knowledge assets that firms invest to run their 
businesses, but that might have no IP: the costs of marketing and launching new products, 
including ongoing investments to maintain the value of a brand, and organisation and human 
capital management innovations (CHS, 2005, 2009).  
 
3.2 From investment to capital stock 
For each asset j, the corresponding stock of intangible capital at time t, 𝑹𝒕
𝒋
, is determined via the 
perpetual inventory relation: 
 
𝑅𝑡
𝑗 = (1 − 𝛿𝑗 ) ∗ 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑗 + 𝑁𝑡
𝑗     [4] 
 
where the term 𝜹
𝒋
 is the asset specific rate of decay of appropriable revenues from the existing 
stock of commercial knowledge (assumed constant over time) and 𝑵𝒕
𝒋
is the value of investment 
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in volume terms in year t. 
How can knowledge depreciate i.e. 𝜹
𝒋
>0, if it does not wear out? As discussed in Pakes and 
Schankerman (1984), δ is the measure of how the value of the usable stock of capital varies over 
time and it can fall for at least two reasons (a) wear and tear and (b) obsolescence whereby new 
capital makes older capital less valuable.  Tangible capital depreciation, where wear and tear is 
well-established should also reflect the obsolescence as well. Intangible capital might have low 
wear and tear but might have very high obsolescence if (a) new ideas are invented that make old 
ones obsolescent (or ideas partially “leave” the firm if there are partially embodied in departing 
workers) and (b) because it might become increasingly difficult for firms to appropriate benefits 
from knowledge as e.g. knowledge leaks out to competitors (e.g. via patent expiry).  
To implement equation 4, we need investment in volume terms, the depreciation rate and the 
value of initial capital stock. Sources and methods adopted to generate nominal investment in 
intangible assets are described in Appendix 1. Nominal investment has to be deflated to get real 
investment. In this paper, we have used national accounts deflators. More precisely, for 
investment in computer software, R&D, Mineral exploration and Artistic original we have used 
the corresponding GFCF deflators. For each of the other assets (that are not currently included in 
the fixed asset boundary of national accounts) we have used the value-added deflator of the 
corresponding industry that is its main producer4 (taken as a proxy of the output deflator, that is 
only available for a limited number of countries). The only exception is new financial products 
for which we have used the R&D deflator.   
As for depreciation rates, we have used the values set out in the final column of  Table 
1 where the rate for mineral exploration is the US BEA rate.5  The others are as discussed 
above or the same as CHS, bar R&D which is 15%.  In the US, BEA, for example, places 
its central estimate of the depreciation rate for R&D at .15. Soloveichik (2010) produced 
depreciation rates for four categories of total artistic originals that also implied rather 
long service lives.  Surveys conducted by the Israeli Statistical Bureau (Peleg 2008a, 
2008b) and by Awano et al. (2010) with the UK Office of National Statistics asked 
about the “life length” of investments in R&D (by detailed industry in Israel) and 
                                                 
4 In particular, we have used value-added deflator of industry M69-70 - “Legal and accounting activities; activities 
of head offices; management consultancy activities” for organizational capital; a weighted average of value-
added deflator of industry M71-“ Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis” and 
M74-75 – “Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities” for design; value-aded 
deflator of industry M73 - “Advertising and market research” for brand; value-added deflator of industry P- 
“Education” for training. 
5 The lifetime of the knowledge created by mineral exploration is the service life of the discovery (a well or a 
mine).  In the Australian national accounts, a service life of 34 years is used whereas the United States uses 12 for 
oil and gas exploration and 20 for mining.  Most U.S. exploration is for oil and gas, and a 12-year life is used for 
the calculations reported in this paper. Note that investment is mineral exploration is negligible for most EU 
countries. 
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intangible assets (R&D plus 5 other asset types in the UK).  The Israeli survey supports 
lengthening the service life for R&D, while the UK survey confirms fast depreciation 
rates for economic competencies.  
 
3.3 Data sources 
Among the intangible assets listed above, only a few are currently capitalised in national accounts 
(SNA 2008/ESA 2010): R&D, mineral exploration, computer software and databases, and 
entertainment, literary and artistic originals (in what follows we refer to this group of assets as 
national accounts intangibles). Expenditures for design, branding, new financial products, 
organisational capital and firm-provided training are instead currently treated as intermediate 
costs (in what follows we refer to this group of assets as new intangibles).   
This paper uses a newly revised and updated release of the INTAN-Invest dataset 
(INTAN-Invest 2016) providing harmonised measures of business intangible investment 
(Table 1) and capital stocks in 18 European economies and the US. Once new intangibles 
are treated as investment the overall pattern of national account value added is adjusted 
to account for the extension of the asset boundaries, thus generating a modified picture 
of the sources of growth. 
The INTAN-Invest 2016 measures of intangibles are obtained following the same 
estimation strategy adopted in the previous releases of INTAN-Invest but resorting to 
new NA data sources. INTAN-Invest 2016 data cover total investment in industries from 
NACE sections A to M (excluding M72) and section S plus the market sector component 
of NACE M72, P, Q and R (while previous INTAN-Invest estimates did not include 
industries P and Q but incorporated industry R as a whole). In the analysis reported in 
this paper we exclude the real estate industry (NACE section L).  
As for sources and methods adopted to generate INTAN-Invest measures of intangibles 
see Appendix 1. 
 
4 Intangible investment in the US and the European countries 
In this section we provide evidence on the diffusion of business intangible investment over the 
period 2000-2013 in the US and in 18 EU economies (EU15 excluding Luxembourg (which will 
be referred to as EU14) plus the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia (which will 
be referred to as the NMS)).  
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4.1 The overall picture 
In 2000-2013, the average share of intangible investment in GDP is relatively higher in 
the US (4.2%) than in the EU14 (3.1%) as well as in the four new EU Member States 
(NMS) included in the analysis (2.2%) (Figure 1). Moreover, national accounts data 
suggest that the GDP share of tangible investment in the three areas (7.7%, 9.2% and 
16.0% respectively) is relatively higher than the intangible share.  
But when new intangible assets are included in the analysis, the intangible investment 
gap between the European economies and the US broadens. New intangibles account for 
4.6% of GDP in the US, and 4.1% and 4.2% in the EU14 and NMS respectively. Adding 
new intangibles to national account assets makes the GDP share of total intangible 
investment increase to 8.8% in the US, 7.2% in the EU14 and 6.4% in the NMS. Hence 
in the US intangibles outpaced tangible investment while in the European economies the 
opposite was the case6. 
However, within the EU14 economies intangible shares of GDP vary considerably, 
revealing an interesting geographical pattern (Table 2). Northern Europe (Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK) and non-German-speaking continental European 
countries (France, Netherlands and Belgium) are highly intangible intensive and 
characterised by higher intangible than tangible shares of GDP over the years 2000-2013. 
Sweden is the leading country with an intangible GDP share of 10.4%, followed by the 
UK (9.0%), Finland (8.8%), France (8.7%), the Netherlands and Ireland (both at 8.5%) 
and Belgium (8.1%) and Denmark (7.8%) lagging slightly behind.  
The Mediterranean and German-speaking countries are relatively less intangible 
intensive economies. In Austria, the intangible investment rate (6.7%) is lower compared 
to the more intangible-oriented economies but still close to the average of the EU14. 
Portugal (6.0%) and Germany (5.9%) are below the EU14 average intangible share of 
GDP followed by Italy (5.3%) and Spain (4.6%). Greece shows the lowest average share 
over the period (3.7%) being an outlier also in terms of the tangible GDP share of 
investment.  
                                                 
6 Although intangible intensity in the four NMS was slightly lower than in the EU14 region, the ratio of tangible 
investment to GDP (16%) was almost 50% higher than in the US and almost 60% higher than in the EU14 region. 
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Figure 1: Intangible and tangible investment (% GDP, average 2000-2013) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts  
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Table 2: Intangible and tangible investment (% GDP, average 2000-2013) 
 
National 
Accounts 
Intangibles 
New 
Intangibles 
Total 
Intangibles 
Tangibles 
Austria 3.1% 3.6% 6.7% 11.4% 
Belgium 2.9% 5.2% 8.1% 11.7% 
Czech 
Republic 
2.5% 4.6% 7.1% 17.8% 
Denmark 3.8% 4.1% 7.8% 9.9% 
Finland 4.3% 4.4% 8.8% 6.9% 
France 4.2% 4.5% 8.7% 7.4% 
Germany 2.8% 3.0% 5.9% 9.7% 
Greece 0.9% 2.8% 3.7% 8.8% 
Hungary 2.0% 4.0% 5.9% 13.3% 
Ireland 3.8% 4.7% 8.5% 9.2% 
Italy 1.9% 3.4% 5.3% 10.0% 
Netherlands 3.4% 5.1% 8.5% 8.3% 
Portugal 1.7% 4.3% 6.0% 11.3% 
Slovenia 2.5% 4.5% 7.0% 15.1% 
Spain 2.1% 2.6% 4.6% 12.7% 
Sweden 5.1% 5.3% 10.4% 9.4% 
Slovakia 1.5% 3.6% 5.1% 17.2% 
United 
Kingdom 
3.4% 5.6% 9.0% 7.5% 
United States 4.2% 4.6% 8.8% 7.7% 
EU14 3.1% 4.1% 7.2% 9.2% 
NMS 2.2% 4.2% 6.4% 16.0% 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
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Table 3: Intangible and tangible capital stock (% GDP, average 2000-2013) 
 
National 
Accounts 
Intangibles 
New 
Intangibles 
Total 
Intangibles 
Tangibles 
Austria 12.3% 9.6% 21.9% 145.5% 
Belgium 13.1% 13.2% 26.3% 129.2% 
Czech 
Republic 
10.6% 13.5% 24.1% 197.4% 
Denmark 18.5% 12.7% 31.3% 151.5% 
Finland 21.2% 12.5% 33.7% 84.0% 
France 18.3% 12.2% 30.5% 80.6% 
Germany  14.1% 8.9% 23.0% 113.7% 
Greece 4.1% 7.8% 11.9% 83.0% 
Hungary 9.6% 12.1% 21.7% 174.3% 
Ireland 15.4% 13.3% 28.6% 78.2% 
Italy 7.8% 10.1% 17.9% 114.8% 
Netherlands 15.3% 12.7% 28.0% 100.2% 
Portugal 6.9% 11.4% 18.3% 122.2% 
Slovenia 11.2% 13.1% 24.4% 182.7% 
Spain 8.2% 7.1% 15.3% 150.7% 
Sweden 24.1% 15.4% 39.4% 102.7% 
Slovakia 5.9% 9.5% 15.3% 257.5% 
United 
Kingdom 
15.1% 15.1% 30.2% 106.9% 
United States 18.2% 11.9% 30.1% 95.4% 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
When looking at capital stocks instead of investment flows, the relative weight of 
tangible and intangible assets changes a lot (Table 3). In all countries, the level of 
tangible capital stock is much higher than the level of intangible. This is due to the fact 
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that depreciation rates of tangible assets are much higher than those of intangible ones 
and this implies, anything else equal, a higher level of capital stock. However, the 
countries that are more intangibles intensive in terms of investment ratio are also the 
more intangible intensive in terms of capital stock ratio.   
The analysis of the composition of intangible investment (% GDP) reveals that in the US 
innovative property and economic competencies are the main drivers of intangible capital 
accumulation (3.5% and 3.7% respectively) while software (1.7%) plays a minor role 
(Figure 2).  
Economic competencies are the main driver of intangible expenditure also in the EU14 
and NMS and computer software remains the smallest component. The same pattern 
holds within the European economies with the notable exception of the Scandinavian 
countries, Germany and Ireland (Table 4), where innovative property is the main 
intangible component (as a result of the high propensity for investing in R&D).   
The asset breakdown suggests that Germany is lagging behind the more intangible-
intensive EU14 countries and the US because of a lower propensity for investing in 
economic competencies and software, while Italy and Spain are relatively lower across 
all intangible asset categories.  
 
Figure 2: Asset composition of intangible investment (% GDP, average 2000-2013) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest 
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Table 4: Asset composition of intangible investment (% GDP, average 2000-2013) 
 
Software Innovative 
Property 
Economic 
Competencies 
Austria 1.5% 2.2% 3.0% 
Belgium 1.1% 2.6% 4.4% 
Czech Republic 1.4% 2.4% 3.2% 
Denmark 1.4% 3.6% 2.9% 
Finland 1.1% 4.3% 3.3% 
France 2.2% 2.9% 3.7% 
Germany 0.7% 2.9% 2.3% 
Greece 0.4% 1.0% 2.3% 
Hungary 0.8% 2.1% 3.0% 
Ireland 0.5% 4.2% 3.8% 
Italy 1.1% 1.8% 2.4% 
Netherlands 1.7% 2.2% 4.5% 
Portugal 0.7% 1.7% 3.6% 
Slovenia 0.8% 3.0% 3.2% 
Spain 0.9% 1.8% 1.9% 
Sweden 1.9% 4.6% 3.9% 
Slovakia 0.9% 1.3% 2.8% 
United Kingdom 1.6% 2.9% 4.6% 
United States 1.6% 3.5% 3.7% 
EU14 1.3% 2.6% 3.2% 
Czech Rep - Hungary -
Slovenia - Slovakia 
1.1% 2.2% 3.1% 
Source: INTAN-Invest 
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The figures in Table 5 show that in the sample areas services invest more than the 
industry sector in intangible assets and that agriculture has negligible shares7. Services 
account for 64% of market sector intangible investment in the US, and for 61.4% and 
57.6% in the EU14 and NMS. However, manufacturing has a higher value added share 
of intangibles than services in both the EU14 and NMS, suggesting that the predominant 
role of services in market sector’s spending for intangible investment is driven by their 
larger share of value added and is not related to a higher propensity for investing in 
intangible assets (Figure 3). 
In the NMS, instead, services are more intangible-intensive than manufacturing. In the 
US intangible intensity in both sectors (12.4% and 14%, respectively) is higher than in 
the two European regions. In the EU14 manufacturing intangible investment as a 
percentage of value added is much higher than in the NMS (11.9% vs 8.7%), while 
services display a comparable share in both European regions (10.3% and 10.2%).  
Table 5 shows that in Finland, Germany and Sweden manufacturing is more intangible-
intensive than services, while Belgium, Ireland and the Netherland have similar 
intensities across both sectors.  
The low intangible intensity of the Mediterranean countries and, to a lesser extent, 
Austria, is due to a relatively low investment level in both sectors (with the only 
exception of Portugal, where intensity in services is higher than the EU14 average). On 
the other hand, the relatively low level of intangible investment in Germany is mainly 
driven by the low investment propensity of services, while manufacturing is at the EU14 
average (but lower than the US level). 
The last three columns in Table 5 illustrate the intangible to tangible investment ratio 
across countries and industries. Services are more intangible than tangible-intensive in 
the US and in both EU regions. The difference between industry and services is much 
higher in the US (1.25 vs 1.03) and in the four NMS (0.53 vs 0.34) than in the EU14 
(0.85 vs 0.79). The EU14 figures mask a great deal of heterogeneity across European 
countries, where services are more intangible than tangible-intensive in five countries 
(including Italy, Spain and the UK), and more or less balanced in the other two (including 
France) while manufacturing takes the lead in the remaining economies (including 
Germany).  
 
                                                 
7 Agriculture corresponds to the NACE Rev.2 section A, Industry to sections from B to F and Services to sections 
from G to U. 
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Figure 3: Intangible investment by industry (% officially measured industry value 
added, average 2000-2013) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
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Table 5: Intangible investment by industry (average 2000-2013) 
 
Industry composition Value added share   
Intangible to  
tangible ratio   
  AGR IND 
SERx
L AGR IND 
SERx
L AGR IND 
SERx
L 
Austria 0% 42% 58% 1% 11% 9% 0.02 0.76 0.57 
Belgium 0% 33% 67% 2% 12% 12% 0.09 0.70 0.72 
Czech 
Republic 0% 43% 56% 1% 9% 11% 0.04 0.35 0.51 
Denmark 0% 39% 61% 2% 14% 10% 0.05 0.98 0.80 
Finland 0% 55% 45% 0% 17% 12% 0.01 1.51 1.40 
France 0% 36% 64% 2% 17% 13% 0.06 1.31 1.27 
Germany 0% 56% 43% 2% 12% 6% 0.05 1.04 0.41 
Greece 1% 37% 62% 1% 8% 6% 0.06 0.70 0.41 
Hungary 1% 40% 59% 1% 9% 10% 0.05 0.38 0.60 
Ireland 0% 40% 60% 1% 12% 12% 0.02 1.33 0.88 
Italy 0% 40% 60% 1% 9% 8% 0.02 0.46 0.70 
Netherlands 1% 28% 71% 4% 11% 12% 0.09 1.00 1.18 
Portugal 1% 23% 76% 2% 7% 11% 0.07 0.31 0.80 
Slovenia 0% 45% 54% 1% 11% 10% 0.04 0.49 0.54 
Spain 0% 33% 66% 0% 6% 7% 0.02 0.28 0.49 
Sweden 0% 53% 47% 2% 22% 13% 0.07 1.42 0.96 
Slovakia 1% 38% 62% 1% 6% 8% 0.05 0.21 0.48 
United 
Kingdom 0% 26% 74% 1% 11% 15% 0.02 0.75 1.73 
United 
States 0% 33% 64% 1% 14% 12% 0.02 1.03 1.25 
EU14 0% 38% 61% 1% 12% 10% 0.04 0.79 0.85 
CZ-HU-SI-SK 1% 42% 58% 1% 9% 10% 0.04 0.34 0.53 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
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4.2 Trends in tangible and intangible investment over the period 2000-2013 
In this section we look at the dynamics of tangible and intangible investment across 18 
European economies and the US over the period 2000-2013. Figure 4 shows that the 
average annual rate of growth of intangible investment in volume terms is negative in 
Greece, Italy and, marginally, in Finland. Sweden is the sole country where intangible 
capital accumulation is significantly less dynamic than tangible capital accumulation. In 
the US the average rate of growth of intangible investment is 2.6 % per year over 2000-
2013, while the rate of tangible investment is 1.0%. The European economies included in 
our analysis grow at a slower pace both in tangible and intangible investment. In the 
EU14, intangible investment increases by 2.0% per year while tangibles grow at the 
modest rate of 0.4% per year. In the NMS the patterns of growth of intangibles and 
tangibles is even more striking, with the former increasing at 1.2% per year and the latter 
decreasing by 0.5 % per year. Figure 5 shows that both intangible and tangible capital 
stock increased over the period 2000-2013 and that the average annual rate of growth of 
intangible capital stock in volume terms is lower than the growth tangible capital only in 
Greece, Italy and, to a lesser extent, in Sweden and Czech Republic.    
 
Tangible investment was significantly affected by the financial crisis in all the sample 
economies (Figure 6). Between the periods 2000-2007 and 2010-2013 the GDP share of 
tangibles fell across all countries. The decline was stronger in the NMS (probably 
reflecting the fact that their catching-up process was taking place and that they were 
converging towards the EU14 levels), in three Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Greece 
and Spain) and in Denmark. In almost all the sample countries, tangible investment 
intensity decreased both during (2008-2009) and after the Great Recession (2010-2013).     
 
In contrast, Figure 7 shows that the intangible investment rate in 2010-2013 increased 
compared to the pre-crisis period 2000-2007 in all countries but Germany and Italy 
(where it remained stable) and the UK where intangibles decreased. The UK is also the 
sole country where intangible intensity slowed down during the Great Recession. In 
Germany, Italy and Sweden intangible intensity remained stable while it increased in all 
the other economies. 
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Figure 4: Real tangible and intangible investment growth (chain linked volumes, 
compounded annual average rates of growth 2000-2013) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
Figure 5: Real tangible and intangible capital stock growth (chain linked volumes, 
compounded annual average rates of growth 2000-2013) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
 
In the countries with a positive dynamic of intangible investment, the average annual rate 
of growth of intangible investment is positive in both the industry and service sectors 
(see Figure A3, in Appendix). Intangible capital accumulation is relatively faster in 
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industry compared to services in Slovakia, Austria and, to a lesser extent, in the US. The 
negative rate of growth for Greece is entirely driven by the industry sector. Italy is the 
sole country showing a reduction of intangible capital accumulation both in industry and 
services. In the three sample areas intangible capital accumulation increased after the 
Great recession compared to the pre-crisis period (2000-2007) in industry as well as in 
services (see Table A1, in Appendix). 
 
Figure 6: Tangible investment (% GDP), 1995-2007, 2008-2009 and 2010-2013 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
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Figure 7: Intangible investment (% GDP), 1995-2007, 2008-2009 and 2010-2013 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
 
4.3 Tangible and intangible investment during the crisis 
The slowdown of gross fixed capital formation experienced by all advanced economies has 
been highly debated since the occurrence of the financial crisis. Figure 8, Figure 9 and Figure 
10 illustrate the dynamics of tangible and intangible investment since 2000. In the US, tangibles 
grew strongly after 2002, fell sharply during the recession (by 24%) and then recovered 
slightly. Intangibles slowed down too (by 7%) but regained pre-crisis rates rapidly after the 
crisis. As a consequence, the ratio between intangible and tangible investment increased during 
the recession, then came back to its mid-2000s level (Figure 8).  
In Europe the picture looks rather different (Figure 9 and Figure 10). During the Great 
Recession in 2008-2009, the EU14 economies experienced a relatively lower decline in 
tangible investment compared to the US (-17%) while intangible investment decreased 
moderately (-2%). The four NMS showed a slightly smaller decline in tangible investment with 
respect to the EU14 and a marginally higher decline in intangible investment (-15 % and -4 % 
respectively).   
Over the post-crisis period, the US and EU economies experienced different investment 
dynamics. In the US both tangible and intangible investments increased steadily. Intangible 
investment exceeded its pre-crisis level in 2011, and in 2013 it was 10% higher than in 2007 
(and 18% higher than in 2009). Tangible investment grew even faster than intangibles and 
reached its pre-crisis level in 2013 (when it was 33% higher than in 2009). In the EU14 
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intangible investment recovered from the crisis level in 2010, but growing at a slower pace 
than in the US from 2011 to 2013 (when it was 6% higher than in 2009). Tangible investment 
increased briefly in 2010-2011 but slowed down immediately with the occurrence of the 
sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2012. In 2012-2013, tangible investment dropped once more 
(though less than in 2008-2009), showing in 2013 a level 15% lower than in 2007. In the NMS 
tangible assets followed a pattern similar to the pattern of the EU14 region. On the other hand, 
intangible investment increased substantially in 2010 and remained more or less stable until 
2013 (when it was only 0.3% higher than before the crisis).   
Figure 11 shows intangible investment in the five larger European economies. Over the period 
2000-2007, the volume of investment in intangible assets increased by 50% in Spain, 25% in 
the UK, 20% in France, 8% in Germany and only 3% in Italy. The impact of the Great 
Recession was fairly strong in Italy and the UK but moderate in Spain, while in Germany and 
France intangible capital accumulation remained stable. After 2009 investment in intangible 
assets accelerated in France and the UK and in Germany but at a slower pace, while it remained 
almost constant in Spain. Italy is the sole country where investment in intangible assets 
declined continuously for the whole period 2008-2013. Over the years 2007-2013 investment 
in intangible assets in volume terms increased by 16% in France, 7% in the UK, 6% in 
Germany, and 1% in Spain, while it declined by 12% in Italy. 
 
Finally, Figure 12 shows the intangible/tangible ratio for the five large EU economies. France 
and the UK record the largest ratio (with intangible investment higher than tangible over the 
whole period), with Italy and Germany further below. Spain shows the lowest value, but in 
2013 it had almost completely converged to the German and Italian levels. In the five countries 
the ratio increased significantly during the Great Recession and reached higher levels in the 
following years. In 2013 the intangible/tangible ratio was about 20% higher than in 2000 in the 
UK, 25% in France, Germany and Italy and 75% in Spain.  
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Figure 8: Tangible and intangible investment, US (chained values, 2007=100) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
Figure 9: Tangible and intangible investment, EU14 (chained values, 2007=100) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
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Figure 10: Tangible and intangible investment, CZ-HU-SI-SK (chained values, 
2007=100) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
Figure 11: Intangible investment in the five large EU economies (chained values, 
2007=100)  
 
 
 Source: INTAN-Invest 
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Figure 12: Intangible over tangible investment ratio in the five large EU economies 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
5 Why intangibles are important  
5.1 Intangibles and economic performance  
The average intangible intensity (as a percentage of GDP) in 2000-2013 is positively 
correlated with GDP per head in 2013 (constant prices, constant PPPs). Likewise, the 
average ratio of intangible over tangible investment in 2000-2013 (see Figure A4 and 
Figure A5, in Appendix). These correlations suggest the existence of two groups of 
countries: low and high intangible intensive. The Mediterranean, Central and Eastern 
European countries are relatively low while the US, the Nordic countries, UK and France 
are high intangible intensive economies. Germany and Austria are relatively low 
intangible intensive but are among the countries with higher GDP per head. 
Overall the countries that were more intangible intensive before the crisis (2000-2007) 
were less affected by the crisis or experienced a faster recovery (in 2013) (see Figure A6, 
in Appendix). The main exceptions are Slovakia (among the countries with the lowest 
intangible intensity but the country that has showed the fastest growth since 2007) and, to 
a lesser extent, Finland and Germany. In this respect, the composition of total investment 
expenditure makes a material difference: there is a positive, although not very strong, 
correlation between the average ratio of intangible over tangible investment in 2000-2007 
and the volume change of GDP from 2007 to 2013 (see Figure A7, in Appendix). 
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5.2 Sources of growth  
The sources of growth exercise covers all 19 countries included in the descriptive analysis. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to provide an analysis of the sources 
of labour productivity growth that explicitly accounts for the contribution of tangible 
capital and an exhaustive list of intangible assets for so many European countries. The 
extended country coverage is not a free lunch. In fact, there is a trade-off between the 
number of countries and the number of years and variables that can be included in the 
analysis. Data availability does not allow us to account for the contribution of labour 
composition. Therefore, the measure of the residual component is the sum of the 
contributions of multi-factor productivity (MFP) and labour composition (LQ) to labour 
productivity growth. Moreover, we are not able to disentangle the contribution of tangible 
capital into the ICT and the non-ICT components. The analysis covers the period 2000-
2013. 
 
5.2.1 2000-2013 
From 2000 to 2013, labour productivity growth was by far the highest in the four new 
Member States and in Ireland (Table 6). Also the US and Sweden, Portugal and Austria 
showed relatively fast productivity growth. Among the larger European countries, the UK, 
France, Germany and Spain all showed positive rates of growth but well below the US, 
while productivity growth was slightly negative in Italy. Productivity slowed down 
significantly in Greece too, while in Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium it was in line 
with the UK, France, Germany and Spain. 
Capital deepening was the main driver of labour productivity growth in 8 out of 19 
countries (FR, EL, HU, IE, IT, PT, ES, SE, US), whereas MFP&LQ accounted for the 
largest part of labour productivity growth in only six countries (FI, DE, NL, SK, SI, UK) 
(Table 6 and Figure 13). Capital deepening and MFP&LQ provided a comparable 
contribution in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Sweden and Denmark. 
Intangible capital emerges as an important source of labour productivity growth in almost 
all countries, the only exception being the countries that showed negative (Italy and 
Greece) or modest growth (Denmark).  
The last three rows in Table 5 show the rate of growth for the US, EU14 and NMS (CZ-
HU-SI-SK). In the US labour productivity growth is 1.8%, in the EU14 1% and in the 
NMS 3%. Intangible capital provided a relatively smaller contribution in the EU14 than 
in the US (0.3% against 0.6%) and the same holds for MFP&LQ. In the NMS intangible 
capital accounts for a similar contribution as in the EU14 while the contribution of tangible 
and MFP&LQ are significantly higher.  
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Table 6: Contributions to the growth of labour productivity in 18 European countries 
and the United States, 2000 to 2013 
 
 
Labour 
Productivity 
Growth Contributions of components 
Memo 
items   
  
Capital 
deepening 
Tangible 
Capital 
Deepening 
Intangible 
Capital 
Deepening MFP&LQ 
SNA2008 
Intangibles 
New 
Intangibles 
AT 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.1 
BE 1.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 
CZ 2.9 1.5 1.2 0.2 1.5 0.1 0.1 
DK 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 
FI 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.0 
FR 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 
DE 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.0 
EL -0.2 1.5 1.4 0.1 -1.7 0.2 0.0 
HU 2.7 2.1 1.6 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 
IE 2.5 2.9 1.9 1.0 -0.5 0.8 0.2 
IT -0.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.0 
NL 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.1 
PT 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 
SK 4.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 3.5 0.1 0.2 
SI 2.5 0.9 0.6 0.4 1.6 0.2 0.2 
ES 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.3 -0.4 0.2 0.1 
SE 1.9 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.1 
UK 1.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.2 
US 1.8 1.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.2 
Memo items (value added 
weighted average)          
EU14 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3   
CZ-HU-SI-SK 3.0 1.4 1.1 0.3 1.6   
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
The dismal Italian performance with respect to the US is accounted for by the negative 
contribution of MFP&LQ and the negligible contribution of intangibles, while tangibles 
are in line with the US experience. As for Spain, the biggest issue is related to the negative 
dynamics of MFP&LQ and, to a lesser extent, to the gap in the contribution of intangible 
capital. Tangible capital provided a contribution of 1 percentage point, well above the 
contribution in the other five large EU economies. The slower productivity growth in 
Germany is almost entirely accounted for by the low propensity to accumulate intangible 
capital, while in France the gap with the US is driven by the lower MFP&LQ and 
intangible capital contribution. The UK is the sole large European economy where the gap 
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with respect to the US is driven by the accumulation of both tangible and, to a lesser 
extent, intangible capital. The EU lagged behind the US in 2000-2013 mainly because of 
the relatively lower dynamic of intangible capital deepening and of MFP&LQ.  
The bottom line in Table 6 is that, although intangible capital has been an important driver 
of growth in the EU14 countries excluding Greece, Italy, Denmark, and, to a lesser extent, 
Germany, the growth contribution of intangible capital is comparatively too small to catch 
up with the US  
A deeper look at the differences between the composition of intangible contributions in the US 
and in the EU economies reveals that in the US the three asset categories provided a high 
contribution. Within innovative property, the contribution of minerals and artistic originals8 
seems particularly strong in the US, while R&D, design and new financial products accounted 
for a similar share in both areas. The high contribution of economic competencies in the US is 
driven by training, (which is falling in Europe), and brand equity. On the other hand, 
organisational capital accounted for a larger share in the EU14 than in the US. 
 
Figure 13: Contributions to the growth of labour productivity in 18 European countries 
and the United States, 2013-2007  
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
                                                 
8 Measurement errors might affect these results. 
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Table 7: Contributions of intangible assets to the growth of labour productivity in 18 
European countries and the United States, 2000 to 2013 
 
  
Intangible 
Capital  Software 
Innov. 
Prop R&D Design NFP Min_Art 
Econ 
Comp. Brand Org_Cap Train 
AT 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.1 0.02 0.08 0.02 
BE 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.2 0.01 0.16 0.03 
CZ 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.07 -0.01 
DK 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.01 -0.05 
FI 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.1 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 
FR 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.06 0.01 
DE 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.0 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 
EL 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.1 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 
HU 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.12 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.3 0.06 0.15 0.05 
IE 1.0 0.1 0.7 0.75 -0.07 0.03 0.03 0.2 0.12 0.12 0.01 
IT 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.0 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 
NL 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.1 0.00 0.12 -0.03 
PT 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.2 0.02 0.11 0.04 
SK 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.2 0.10 0.06 0.02 
SI 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.1 0.06 0.06 0.02 
ES 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.02 
SE 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.0 -0.04 0.09 -0.02 
UK 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.10 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.1 0.00 0.19 -0.07 
US 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.2 0.05 0.04 0.06 
Memo items (value 
added weighted 
average)             
EU14 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.1 0.00 0.07 -0.01 
CZ-HU-SI-
SK 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.1 0.04 0.09 0.02 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
 
 
5.2.2 2000-2007 and 2007-2013 
Table 8 shows that in 2007-2013 labour productivity growth decelerated in nearly all 
countries compared to the 2000-2007 period, the only exceptions being Italy, Portugal, 
Ireland and Spain (which is the sole country where labour productivity accelerated 
considerably) (see also Figure A8, in Appendix).  
As expected, the slowdown is driven mainly by the negative contribution of MFP&LQ. 
During the recession years, the measured contributions of capital and labour is distorted 
by swings in the rate of capital utilisation and effort that are not captured by the available 
measures of capital stocks and hours worked. Consequently MFP is to a large extent 
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capturing the changes in labour productivity due to the fact that firms do not reduce 
instantaneously their inputs according to changes in output (due to, e.g., labour market 
regulations, labour hoarding, and irreversibility of installed fixed capital).  
The contribution of capital deepening significantly slowed down in Greece, the Czech 
Republic, and, to a lesser extent, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden and the US. In Greece, 
Slovenia and Sweden the slowdown was almost entirely driven by the tangible 
component, while in the Czech Republic, Hungary and the US by both components. 
Finland and the UK are the only two countries where the contribution of the intangible 
capital component declined with respect to the previous period while that of the tangible 
one increased (Finland) or remained stable (UK).  
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Table 8: Contributions to the growth of labour productivity in 18 European countries 
and the United States, 2000-2007 and 2007-2013 
 
 2000-2007 2007-2013 
 
Labour 
Productivity 
Growth Contributions of components 
Labour 
Productivity 
Growth Contributions of components 
  
Capital 
deepening 
Tangible 
Capital 
Deepening 
Intangible 
Capital 
Deepening MFP&LQ 
Capital 
deepening 
Tangible 
Capital 
Deepening 
Intangible 
Capital 
Deepening MFP&LQ 
AT 2.2 0.6 0.3 0.4 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.0 
BE 2.0 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.4 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.4 -0.2 
CZ 5.4 1.9 1.5 0.4 3.4 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.0 -0.8 
DK 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.2 
FI 2.8 0.4 0.0 0.4 2.4 -0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 -1.2 
FR 1.6 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.5 -0.1 
DE 1.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 
EL 2.6 1.9 1.8 0.1 0.7 -3.5 1.2 1.0 0.1 -4.6 
HU 4.8 2.2 1.7 0.5 2.5 0.2 1.8 1.5 0.4 -1.7 
IE 2.3 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.0 2.7 3.6 2.3 1.3 -1.0 
IT 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.7 
NL 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.4 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 -0.2 
PT 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.3 0.4 1.9 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.4 
SK 6.0 0.0 -0.2 0.2 5.9 1.6 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.7 
SI 4.7 1.1 0.8 0.3 3.6 -0.1 0.7 0.3 0.4 -0.8 
ES 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.2 -0.6 1.7 2.0 1.5 0.5 -0.3 
SE 3.5 1.2 0.9 0.3 2.3 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.2 -0.6 
UK 2.5 0.6 0.1 0.5 1.9 -0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 -0.6 
US 2.4 1.3 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.3 
Memo items (value 
added weighted 
average) 
                
EU14 1.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.3 -0.4 
CZ-HU-
SI-SK 5.2 1.6 1.2 0.4 3.6 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.2 -0.8 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
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5.2.3 Comparison with national accounts-based results 
Table 9 sets out growth accounting but using national accounts intangibles. Looking again at 
the lowest three lines, and comparing them with the lowest three lines in the equivalent table 
that uses all intangibles, we see that, broadly, including intangibles raises the capital 
contribution and lowers TFP growth, with, over this period, growth in output per hour 
unaffected.  So the contribution of capital and TFP with intangibles capitalised in the US for 
example is 1.1% pa and 0.7% pa, but without is 1% pa and 0.9% pa.  In the EU14 the equivalent 
figures are 0.7% pa and 0.3% pa and 0.6% pa and 0.4% pa.  Thus the inclusion of intangibles 
lowers the “measure of our ignorance”.  
 
Table 9: Contributions to the growth of labour productivity in 18 European countries 
and the United States, only national accounts intangibles, 2000 to 2013 
 
 
Labour Productivity 
Growth 
Contributions of components 
  
Capital 
deepening 
Tangible 
Capital 
Deepening 
Intangible 
Capital 
Deepening MFP&LQ 
AT 1.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.9 
BE 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.7 
CZ 3.0 1.5 1.3 0.1 1.6 
DK 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 
FI 1.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.8 
FR 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.4 
DE 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.7 
EL -0.1 1.7 1.6 0.2 -1.8 
HU 2.7 2.0 1.8 0.3 0.6 
IE 2.4 3.1 2.2 1.0 -0.7 
IT 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.1 -0.6 
NL 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.7 
PT 1.8 1.4 1.2 0.2 0.4 
SK 3.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 3.7 
SI 2.4 0.8 0.6 0.2 1.6 
ES 0.8 1.2 1.0 0.2 -0.4 
SE 2.0 1.0 0.8 0.2 1.0 
UK 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.9 
US 1.8 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.9 
Memo items (value  
added  
weighted average)        
EU14 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 
CZ-HU-SI-SK 3.0 1.3 1.2 0.2 1.7 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on national accounts 
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6 Drivers of investment in intangible assets  
In the previous section we showed that the propensity to invest in intangible assets is positively 
correlated with some measures of economic performance (GDP per head and GDP growth since 
the beginning of the Great Recession) and that, in a growth accounting sense, intangible 
investment is an important driver of labour productivity growth. At this point, it is natural to ask 
why some countries appear to invest more in intangible investment than others. A comprehensive 
discussion of all the potential determinants of intangible investment is well beyond the scope of 
the paper. In this section we present a very preliminary analysis of the correlation between 
intangible investment and two elements that could potentially affect it: firm size, and product and 
labour market regulation.    
    
6.1 Intangibles and firm size  
The issue of the link between firm size and investment in intangible assets is surveyed by 
Arrighetti et al. (2014). Firm size is likely to have a positive impact on the propensity to 
invest in intangible assets for three reasons. In the first place, large firms are better able 
than small ones to exploit economies of scale in intangible asset accumulation (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989). Secondly, big firms can be more effective in protecting their intangible 
stock than small ones, and thus have a greater incentive to invest. Thirdly, it may be argued 
that large firms are also capable of supporting a greater amount of the uncertainty that is 
associated with intangible asset investments as compared to small firms (Ghosal and 
Loungani, 2000). 
The (scant) empirical evidence on the link between firm size and intangible investment is 
consistent with the view that the propensity to invest in intangible assets is positively 
correlated with firm size. Arrighetti et al. (2014) shows that in a sample of Italian 
manufacturing firms, size increases significantly the probability of being an intangible-
intensive firm (where intangibles are measured as a subset of the costs usually reported 
under the item “intangible fixed assets” in firms’ financial statements). The NESTA 
survey “Investing in innovation” for the UK (Awano et al., 2010) finds that among firms 
that replied to the survey, large firms are more likely to report positive spending on one 
or more intangible assets than smaller firms, although for all intangible spend, intensity 
does not vary with size, so large firms, who have a higher overall spend, do not have larger 
intensity. Likewise, a recent study from the European Commission (2013) shows that the 
smaller the company, the more likely they are to have made no investment in intangible 
assets (either using internal resources or external providers). For instance, 39% of 
companies with 1-9 employees say they invested nothing using internal resources for 
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organisational or business process improvement in 2011, compared to 8% of those with 
250 or more. If the empirical evidence on intangible investment is scant, there is a vast 
literature analysing the links between firm size and innovation (often measured as R&D 
expenditure). Here we only mention the results of the Community Innovation Survey 
2008, which shows that large enterprises are more likely to introduce innovations than 
SMEs in almost all countries for which data are available (Eurostat, 2012).  
To investigate this issue, we have calculated the cross-country correlation between 
intangible investment (measured both as a percentage of value added and as an 
intangible/tangible ratio) and the average firm size, measured as the share of persons 
employed in firms with more than 250 employees. Correlations are calculated by industry 
to control for different average firm size in various economic activities (see Table A2, in 
Appendix). Intangible intensity and the intangible to tangible ratio are positively 
correlated with the average firm size in 10 out of 11 industries, the only exception being 
“Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities” (where the 
correlation is negative but very close to zero). The correlation between intangible intensity 
and average firm size is higher than 0.2 in 8 out 11 industries, while the correlation 
between intangible to tangible ratio and average firm size is higher than 0.2 in 9 out 11 
industries.  
   
6.2 Intangibles and product and labour market regulation  
The issue of the link between product market regulation (PMR) and investment and 
innovation is surveyed by Schiantarelli (2016) and we rely heavily on his work. Alesina 
et al. (2005) identify several ways in which product market regulation can affect 
investment. First, changes in regulation affect the markup of prices over marginal costs, 
because of their impact, for instance, on entry barriers and, hence, on the number of firms. 
Second, regulation can influence the costs that even existing firms face when expanding 
their productive capacity. Third, for certain sectors, regulation imposes a ceiling on the 
rate of return on capital that firms are allowed to earn; this leads firms to increase the level 
of capital stock beyond the profit-maximizing level in order to obtain a greater total 
remuneration for capital. Removing the constraint on the rate of return (if binding) would, 
instead, reduce the desired capital stock and therefore investment. Finally, if product 
markets’ regulatory reforms occur together with privatisation (or nationalisation) policies, 
changes in ownership structure can also affect investment. Public enterprises are often 
heavy investors, either because of political mandates or because of incentives to over-
expand on firms’ managers. Reduced investment by the public sector may therefore occur. 
Ultimately, which effect dominates is an empirical question. Alesina et al. (2005), in their 
empirical work, examine investment in non-manufacturing industries (e.g. energy, 
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utilities, communication, and transport) in OECD countries that have experienced 
profound changes in their regulatory framework. The results suggest that reducing 
regulation has a significant and sizeable positive effect on the investment rate, particularly 
if the regulation affects barriers to entry.  
Studies that focus on liberalisation episodes in specific sectors provide further evidence 
on the effect of product market regulation on investment. For instance, Schivardi and 
Viviano (2011) provide evidence on the relaxation of limits to the opening of large stores 
in Italy. The results suggest that reducing entry barriers stimulates investment in 
information and telecommunication technologies (which, in their data, also includes 
investment in computer software). 
Contrasting forces may influence the effect of greater competition on innovation. On the 
one hand, innovation activity is primarily driven by the aim of achieving monopoly profits 
on new products or processes. If monopoly profits decrease as a result of regulatory 
reforms, the pace of innovation may likewise be reduced. Furthermore, monopoly profits 
help firms to accumulate enough funds to finance innovation. In fact, funds generated 
internally through retained profits are crucial given the presence of information 
asymmetries, which may make it costly or difficult to obtain external funds from financial 
markets for risky innovation activities that are difficult to evaluate. Indeed in the early 
quality ladder endogenous growth models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) and in the product variety model of Romer (1990) a reduction in 
rents generated by regulatory changes would adversely affect the incentive to innovate. 
Nevertheless, in more recent models, incumbent firms also innovate (rather than just 
newcomers) (Aghion and Griffith, 2005). In these models, the difference between post 
and pre-innovation monopoly profits determines the incentive to innovate. Greater 
competition reduces both, but if the pre-innovation profits decrease more than the post-
innovation profits, this fosters innovation. Essentially, competition stimulates innovation 
due to the threat of (or actual) entry of newcomers into a market, which provides 
incentives for incumbents to innovate in order to escape competition. 
The issue of the effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) on productivity and 
investment is nicely surveyed by Bassanini, Nunziata, and Venn (2009), who make a 
number of points. First, the effects of EPL depend on how much they are offset by wage 
adjustments. If wages do not fully adjust to any costs that EPL might impose, then EPL 
can have real effects. Second, those effects can vary.  If labour costs rise, then investment 
rises as labour gets more expensive.  Against this, investment might fall if workers cannot 
commit to future wages and EPL strengthens the bargaining position of labour to extract 
any ex post rents from sunk capital (Grout, 1984).  If intangible capital is more sunk 
relative to tangible capital, then investment in intangibles will fall more.  The wage effect, 
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however, might be moderated by (perhaps centralised) unions, who might find it easier to 
precommit, perhaps in national wage bargains.  This is the story in the Sapir report 
(Aghion et al., 2003), suggesting that centralised German unions were useful in the long 
period of post-war tangible capital accumulation by Europe, but might be much less useful 
now when intangible capital and experimentation are required. Finally, Bartelsman, 
Gautier, and de Wind (2011) suggest that experimentation with risky technologies might 
be lessened, so average productivity falls.  The effects are likely to be analogous with 
product market regulation. 
Finally, Ciriaci et al. (2016) show that product market regulation and employment 
protection legislation significantly affect the location decision of top R&D investors’ 
subsidiaries. When taken separately, the level of PMR has the greatest negative effect on 
companies’ location decisions, while EPL does not appear to play a significant role in 
such choices. When considering the interaction between PMR and EPL, results show that 
these two regulations exert a mutually reinforcing negative effect on the decision of top 
R&D investors about where to locate their subsidiaries. 
The evidence from INTAN-Invest data is that countries with less stringent regulations in 
product and labour markets tend to have higher rates of investment in intangible assets 
and higher intangible to tangible investment ratios (see Figures A9 to A12, in Appendix). 
The negative relation between the propensity to invest in intangible assets and the level of 
product market regulation holds for all three major components of intangible assets 
(computer software and databases, innovative property and economic competencies) and 
for all three high-level economy-wide indicators of product market regulation (state 
control, barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment) (see Table A3, 
in Appendix).  
  
6.3 Determinant of the intangible to tangible investment ratio  
In this section we attempt to explore econometrically why some countries appear to invest 
more in intangible investment than others, allowing for more factors than just the 
regulatory factors set out above.  The following points are worth noting.  
First, there may be some “structural” reasons for this.  For example, countries with more 
services might be more intangible-intensive.  Or countries with more ICT intensity.  
Second, public sector R&D might be complementary to private sector intangible 
investment, and hence it might be that countries with more government-funded R&D are 
investing more. Third, the neo-classical explanation is that relative prices will determine 
relative investment, with relative prices particularly affected by the tax treatment of 
intangibles and tangibles.  
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Fourth, econometric estimation of investment equations has not often found it easy to find 
plausible price elasticities and discover the effects of e.g. liquidity constraints and the like.  
Part of this is that investment seems to be cyclical in ways that prices and adjustment costs 
have problems describing them, perhaps due to animal spirits and other unmeasureables.  
This suggests that we might proceed by exploring intangible investment relative to 
tangible investment, thereby sweeping out any common effects affecting investment 
“sentiment” that seem so hard to model.  Thus we ran the following regression where the 
dependent variable is the log of relative intangible to tangible real investment 
 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , ,
ln( / ) ln( / ) _
_ ( & / )
INTAN TAN INTAN TAN
c t i i c t c t c t
c t c t t c t
I I P P STRICTNESS ICT INTEN
share mfring GovR D GDP v
  
  
  
   
  
 
Where the terms on the right are, respectively, relative investment price, the OECD index 
of employment strictness, the ratio of ICT capital rental payments to total tangible rental 
capital payments, the share of employment in manufacturing and the ratio of government-
funded R&D to GDP.  Each variable is at the country-year dimension, where for 
convenience the variables are all averages over the following four periods: 1997-1999, 
2000-2003, 2004-2008 and 2011-2013.  The equation also includes a constant and three 
time dummies and estimation is by random effects (we could not reject the hypothesis that 
the fixed effects were jointly zero).  For this exercise we have data on 12 countries.  The 
relative investment, prices and ICT intensity data are all for the private sector.  
Column 1 in Table 10 shows the results. The relative price term is correctly signed and 
significant, showing a strong relative price effect.  It would be preferable to incorporate 
tax adjustment factors for intangibles and tangibles, but at the time of writing we do not 
have them.  Turning to the second and third rows, countries with higher ICT intensity and 
lower manufacturing shares are associated with higher relative intangible investment, in 
line with the view that intangibles are complementary to ICT and that the intangible to 
tangible ratio is higher in the service sector.  The OECD strictness index is strongly 
negatively correlated with relative intangible investment, in line with the graphs in the 
Appendix. Finally, countries with more government R&D have high relative intangible 
investment, in line with the view that such public investment is complementary to private 
intangible investment.  
The rest of Table 10 explores robustness. Column 2 replaces employment strictness with 
product market regulation and finds, again, a negative and statistically significant 
association.  Column 3 puts them together, but they would seem too collinear (i.e. 
countries that tend to have a lower level of product market regulation also tend to have a 
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lower level of employment protection and vice versa) to get a strong relation with both.  
 
Table 10: Intangible/tangible regression, 12 countries, 1997 to 2013 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Employ 
Strict 
Prod mkt 
reg Both drop CZ 
          
ln(Pi_INTAN/Pi_TAN) -1.149*** -0.986*** -1.106*** -1.195*** 
 (0.342) (0.314) (0.323) (0.289) 
ICT_INTEN 0.169 0.356 -0.276 0.185 
 (1.602) (1.605) (1.661) (1.565) 
sh_mfring -0.629 -1.594 -0.979 -0.052 
 (0.945) (1.347) (1.075) (1.170) 
STRICTNESS -0.435***  -0.404*** -0.441*** 
 (0.137)  (0.145) (0.161) 
PROD MKT REG  -0.204** -0.130 -0.037 
  (0.103) (0.126) (0.127) 
Gov R&D/GDP 75.552*** 77.251*** 68.335*** 72.788** 
 (26.499) (27.001) (26.192) (32.043) 
     
Observations 48 48 48 44 
Countries 12 12 12 11 
R2 0.518 0.527 0.550 0.482 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
 
 
7 Conclusions and policy implications  
Summing up from the descriptive analysis reported in section 4 we can identify the 
following stylised facts. First, from 2000 to 2013 average intangible intensity (% GDP) in 
the US (8.8%) was higher than in the EU14 (7.2%) and in the four new Member States 
included in our analysis (6.4%). In the US investment in intangible assets outpaced 
tangible capital accumulation, while in the EU regions it is the opposite. Within the EU14 
countries the propensity for investing in intangibles varies considerably with 
Scandinavian, Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK) and 
non-German-speaking continental European countries (France, the Netherlands and 
Belgium) characterised by relatively high intangible shares of GDP. On the other hand, 
the Mediterranean and German-speaking countries are relatively more tangible-intensive 
economies.  
In all the sample economies, intangible investments are more dynamic than tangibles. 
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Greece, Italy and marginally Finland are an exception because they experienced a 
slowdown of intangible capital accumulation (even if less pronounced than the downturn 
of tangible capital accumulation). The Great Recession had a differentiated effect on 
tangible and intangible investment: tangibles fell massively during the crisis and have 
hardly recovered, whereas intangible investment has been relatively resilient and 
recovered fast in the US but lagged behind in the EU. 
In the previous sections we have shown that intangible intensity and the intangible to 
tangible ratio are positively correlated with the level of GDP per head and negatively 
associated with the financial shock of the Great Recession (measured as the ratio of 
chained GDP in 2013 to the value in 2007).  
The sources of growth analysis first support the evidence that intangible capital deepening 
is an important driver of growth in 2000-2013 in the US and in the EU14 countries with 
the exception of Greece, Italy, Denmark, and, to a lesser extent, Germany. These results 
are sensitive to the extension of the national account asset boundary to the CHS list of 
intangibles. Once all intangible assets are capitalised capital deepening remains a relevant 
driver of growth but with a more prominent contribution of intangible capital. Sources of 
growth results suggest that since the Great Recession labour productivity slowdown has 
been driven primarily by TFP. 
Our preliminary analysis of the drivers of investment in intangible assets shows that 
countries with higher average firm size and less stringent regulations in product and labour 
markets have a higher intangible investment rate and higher intangible to tangible 
investment ratio. The econometric analysis on a subset of countries reveals a significant 
correlation between having stricter employment protection rules and less government 
investment in R&D, such as in the Mediterranean countries, and a lower ratio of intangible 
to tangible investment (controlling for other factors). 
Our findings suggest that intangible investment is a key policy variable. A relevant 
characteristic of intangible capital is that it is growth-promoting (Corrado, Haskel, and 
Jona-Lasinio, 2014) thus potentially contributing to reducing the growth gap between the 
EU and the US. Therefore policies designed to foster innovation and to make the economic 
environment more conducive to investment in intangible assets should adopt a view of 
innovation that is broader than R&D. In fact, our growth accounting results show that the 
investment gap between the EU14 and the US is more related to the lower contributions 
of computer software and databases, artistic originals, mineral exploration, brand and 
training than to the contribution of R&D.  
Finally, the very preliminary evidence presented in this paper on the drivers of intangible 
investment is consistent with the view that economic policies should target SMEs, focus 
on maintaining well-functioning product and labour markets and guarantee an appropriate 
40 
 
level of government investment in R&D. Additional research is needed to validate our 
preliminary findings. The next steps will be to refine our econometric analysis extending 
the number of countries, including additional explanatory variables and exploiting the 
industry dimension of INTAN-Invest 2016. 
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Appendix 1. Measuring Intangible Investments: the INTAN-Invest database 
The INTAN-Invest estimates reported in this paper (INTAN-Invest 2016) are the result 
of a complete revision and update of previous INTAN-Invest data. INTAN-Invest 2016 
estimates are based on the same estimation strategy adopted to produce previous releases 
of INTAN-Invest estimates. However, new data sources have become available since 
estimates for previous benchmark years were produced. In order to fully exploit the new 
data sources, a complete revision of previous estimates was needed.  
The main pillar of INTAN-Invest estimation strategy is the adoption of the expenditure-
based approach to measure the value of investment in intangible assets (i.e., expenditure 
data are used to develop direct measures of intangible investment). Moreover, the project 
have the goal of generating measures of harmonized intangible investment satisfying (as 
much as possible) the following criteria: exhaustiveness, reproducibility, comparability 
across countries and over time, and consistency with official national accounts data (since 
our aim is  to  generate measures of intangible  investment  coherent with other national 
accounts aggregates, as output,  investment in tangible assets,  intermediate  costs, 
compensation of employees  and employment) 
The above characteristics are assured by the adoption of official data sources 
homogeneous across countries. An implication of the adopted estimation strategy is that 
our estimation methods can be applied only for the years when national accounts data are 
available. For EU countries, the starting date of national accounts data from Eurostat 
database usually ranges from 1995 (for almost all countries) to 2000 (and even more 
recent years for detailed data on GFCF by industry in a few countries). The relatively 
short time coverage for European countries is one of the main weaknesses of our 
database, because a longer time period would be preferred for the analysis of economic 
growth. 
The industry and sector coverage in INTAN-Invest 2016 has changed with respect to the 
previous INTAN-Invest releases. New estimates cover total investment in industries 
from Nace sections A to M (excluding M72) and section S plus the market sector 
component of Nace M72, P, Q and R (while previous INTAN-Invest estimates did not 
cover industries P and Q and covered all industry R). 
The new definition of the market sector makes INTAN-Invest 2016 fully consistent with 
SPINTAN estimates. SPINTAN is a project funded by the European Union’s Seventh 
Framework Programme that aims at discovering the theoretical and empirical 
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underpinning of public intangible policies and that has among its objectives to build a 
public intangible database for a wide set of EU countries and some other big non-EU 
countries.  
The two projects, although different and independent, share the same measurement 
approach and refer to two non-overlapping cross-classifications of sectors and industries. 
INTAN-Invest and SPINTAN estimates, taken together, provide harmonized measures 
of investment in intangible assets for the total economy cross classified by 21 industries 
(corresponding to the sections of the Nace rev. 2 classification) and two institutional 
sectors (market and non-market) - see Bacchini et al. (2016) for an overview of the  
estimation methods adopted to produce SPINTAN estimates. 
The implementation of INTAN-Invest estimation strategy leads to the adoption of two 
different approaches for intangible assets not currently included in the 
SNA2008/ESA2010 asset boundary (Design, Brand, Training, Organisational Capital 
and New financial products) and for the assets already included (Computer software and 
databases, Research and development, Mineral Explorations and evaluations and 
Entertainment, literary and artistic originals).  
National Accounts Intangible Assets are based on official national accounts estimates of 
gross fixed capital formation by industry. National accounts data on GFCF in Intellectual 
property products (“IPP”) by 21 industries and total GFCF (with no industry 
disaggregation) in Computer software and databases (“Soft”) and in Research and 
development (“R&D”) are available for all countries included in our analysis. Moreover, 
for almost all countries also data on Soft and R&D by 21 industries are available. For 
these countries, we estimate overall GFCF in Mineral Explorations and Originals 
(“MinArt”) by 21 industries as a residual. Instead, for countries where only total IPP by 
industry is available, we have adopted the following approach. First, we have produced 
preliminary estimates of the industry distribution of GFCF in Soft, R&D, and MinArt 
using the available indicators. Then we have rescaled preliminary estimates to make them 
consistent with total GFCF in IPP by industry and with aggregate GFCF in Soft, R&D 
and MinArt (using an iterative bi-proportional fitting procedure). The preliminary 
estimates have been derived from ESA95 national accounts data on GFCF by industry or 
from capital stocks estimates9, depending on data availability.  
                                                 
9 The country coverage of capital stocks data on Soft and R&D by industry is larger than the country coverage of 
GFCF data. Then, there are several countries for which capital stocks data by industry are available and GFCF is 
not. In this case, we have used capital stocks data as follows. Starting from capital stock estimates (chained 
values) for year t and t-1 (Kt and Kt-1) and making an assumption on the value of the depreciation rate (delta) 
we have computed the implied value of chained investment for year t (It), as   
It=Kt – Kt-1 + Kt-1*delta. 
If net capital stocks were estimated with the geometric model and if we knew the actual depreciation rate used 
to compute capital stocks the above calculation would provide the correct value for It. In the EU, national 
44 
 
 
Once we have obtained total investment in the three asset types by industry, we have 
obtained the split between the market and the non-market component for each asset in 
each industry simply deducting from total GFCF by industry the estimates for the non-
market component available from the SPINTAN project. 
The estimates of the purchased component of Brand, Design and Organisational Capital 
in INTAN-Invest 2016 are based on completely different sources and methods with 
respect to the previous release of INTAN-Invest. Old estimates for the business sector 
were obtained from data on turnover of the corresponding industries and, as for Brand, 
also on private data sources (Zenith Optimedia and ESOMAR). Industry level estimates 
were obtained following a top-down approach10. New estimates, instead, are obtained 
directly at the industry level using expenditure data by industry provided by the Use 
Tables, expressed according to the NACE Rev2/CPA 2008 classifications. Use Tables 
consistent with ESA2010 national accounts are available for all countries included in this 
paper for 2010 and 2011 and for almost all countries for the year 2012, while Use Tables 
consistent with ESA95 national accounts are available from 2008 until 2010.  
The Use Tables compiled according to NACE Rev.2/CPA 2008 report intermediate costs 
of each industry for the following products: Advertising and Market Research Services 
(CPA M73), Architectural and engineering services, technical testing and analysis 
services (CPA M71) and Legal and accounting services, services of head offices and 
management consulting services (CPA M69 and M70). We take the data on total 
intermediate costs for these products as a proxy for total expenditure, respectively, in 
Brand, Design and Organisational capital. 
The general approach is quite similar for all three assets. The first step is to make the 
initial data a better proxy of expenditure in the corresponding asset. We deem that in the 
case of Advertising and Market Research Services (CPA M73) and Architectural and 
engineering services, technical testing and analysis services (CPA M71) the products 
identified in the USE Table are good proxies of the corresponding assets and no further 
                                                 
statistical institutes usually do not use the geometric method (with the exception of R&D), then the result of the 
calculation above can provide only an approximation of the real value of It. We use these approximated 
estimates as a preliminary estimate of investment by industry (i.e., as seeds for the iterative bi-proportional 
fitting). On the other hand, it is likely that the bias is quite similar across industries and therefore it should 
decrease when the initial estimates are re-scaled to make them consistent with total GFCF in IPP by industry and 
with aggregate GFCF in Soft, R&D and MinArt. 
10 Old INTAN-Invest estimates by industry were obtained as follows. We first produced a detailed benchmark 
estimate of intangible investment in 2008 based on the USE table and then we built time series for the period 
1995 to 2007 applying the rate of change of gross output (National Accounts) by industry to the level of the 
estimated intangible gross fixed capital formation in 2008. Finally, since our benchmark was the INTAN-invest 
market sector estimate of intangibles, we rescaled the estimated value for each industry, in each country, for 
every year, to the total provided by INTAN-invest (see Corrado et al (2014) for more details).  
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adjustments are needed. In contrast, this is not the case for Legal and accounting services, 
services of head offices and management consulting services (CPA M69 and M70). In 
this case, we computed the share of turnover of NACE M701 in turnover of NACE M69 
plus M70 for each country and we apply the share to intermediate consumption in CPA 
M69 and M70. The above correction is based on the assumption that, in each country the 
share of CPA M701 (consulting services) in total intermediate consumption for CPA 
M69 and M70 is the same across all industries.   
Once expenditure for each asset is identified, the second step is to split total expenditure 
in each industry between the component due to the market sector and the component due 
to the non-market sector. This adjustment is applied only to the SPINTAN mixed 
industries (M72, P, Q and R90-92), while for all other industries we deem that the 
expenditure is entirely made up either by the non-market sector (industry O) or by the 
market sector (all remaining industries). The split is based on the share of non-market 
output over total market and non-market output in each industry. 
Finally, in each industry the capitalization factor is applied to total expenditure by market 
producers to obtain the value of total expenditure that we deem should be treated as 
GFCF instead than intermediate consumption. Capitalisation factors are asset specific 
but not industry specific with the only exception of a special treatment for subcontracting. 
In fact, it is likely that part of Advertising and Market Research Services (CPA M73) 
bought by the Advertising and Market Research industry, that part of Design services 
(CPA M71) bought by the Architectural and engineering industry and that part of Legal, 
accounting and consulting services (CPA M69 and M70) bought by the Legal, accounting 
and consulting industry are due to subcontracting activity. For this reason, we assume 
that the capitalisation factors for CPA M73 in the Advertising and Market Research, for 
CPA M71 in the Architectural and engineering industry and for CPA M69 and M70 in 
the Legal, accounting and consulting industry are 50% lower than in the other industries. 
The approach outlined above is used to obtain estimates from 2010 until 2012 (the years 
in which USE Tables consistent with ESA2010 national accounts are available). The 
same approach has been applied to the USE Tables consistent with ESA95 available from 
2008 and 2010 and the resulting estimates have been used as indicators to back-cast the 
level of the estimated intangible gross fixed capital formation in 2010 until 2008. The 
back-casting procedure has been implemented at the industry level. For the years before 
2008, we produced intangible investment time series using the rate of change of the 
previous release of INTAN-Invest estimates of GFCF by industry as an indicator to back-
cast the level of the estimated gross fixed capital formation from 1995 to 2008. 
The estimates based on data available from the USE Tables guarantee the exhaustiveness 
of purchased GFCF in Brand (based on product CPA M73) and Organisational capital 
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(based on product CPA M6970), but not that of Design (based on product CPA M71). In 
fact, in the CPA classification, part of design activity is also classified in the CPA M741 
“Specialised design activities”. The USE Tables currently available from Eurostat do not 
allow identifying expenditure in CPA M741 because they only report data for the CPA 
M74_75 (“Other professional, scientific and technical services and veterinary services”). 
Instead, Structural Business Statistics report data on turnover of NACE M741. Then we 
have taken the turnover of NACE M741 as a proxy of total expenditure in CPA M741, 
we have assumed that only the market sector purchases “Specialised design activities” 
and, finally, we have obtained GFCF estimate applying the same capitalisation factor 
than CPA M71. 
As for the own account component, its estimate requires detailed employment data by 
type of occupation and by industry (e.g., from the Structure of Earning survey or the 
Labour Force survey) or a special survey. Eurostat available occupational data allow 
identifying only those occupations related with organizational capital. This is why, at this 
stage, we measure only the own account component of Organizational capital, while for 
Design and Brand we only estimate the purchased component. 
In order to estimate organisational capital produced on own account we need to estimate 
total compensation of managers and then apply a capitalisation factor. The estimate of 
total compensation of managers requires data on the number of managers and their 
average compensation. The main data sources for these variables is the Structure of 
Earnings Survey that is currently available for 2002, 2006 and 2010. From SES we are 
able to compute industry specific shares of gross earnings of managers in total earnings 
of all employees for the years 2006 and 2010 and the share for business sector in 2002. 
We have produced a time series of industry specific shares of gross earnings of managers 
from 1995 till 2013 as follows. For the years 2007-2009 we have (linearly) interpolated 
values from SES available for 2006 and 2010. We have updated the industry specific 
shares for the years from 2010 onwards applying the dynamic of the share of the number 
of managers in total employees from Labour Force Surveys. For the year before 2006 no 
data at the industry level are available, then we back-casted 2006 shares using the same 
indicator for all industries (namely, the change in the share of gross earnings of managers 
for total business sector between 2002 and 2006 from SESs and the change in the share 
of the number of managers in total employees from Labour Force Surveys for the 
previous years).  Having produced a time series of the shares of gross earnings of 
managers at the industry level is a big improvement with respect to the previous INTAN-
Invest release, that considered only the business sector with no industry detail and was 
based on the share obtained from SES 2002 updated using the change in the share of the 
number of managers in total employees from Labour Force Surveys. 
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We have then estimated total expenditure for management compensation consistent with 
national accounts data by applying the share of gross earnings of managers to national 
accounts measures of total compensation of employees in each industry. Finally, we have 
estimated the value of own-account investment in organisational capital by applying the 
capitalisation factor to the total managers’ compensation.  
As for Firm specific Human Capital, our estimates for the market sector are based on 
data from the Continuing Vocational Training Survey (CVTS) and Labour Cost Survey, 
that allow to produce industry level estimates of expenditure in training that include both 
the purchased and the own account component. For this asset the main improvement with 
respect to the old estimates is due to the availability of the CVTS for 2010 (while old 
estimates only used the 1999 and the 2005 survey). For training, we assume that all 
expenditures increase the value of the stock of FSHC and therefore should be considered 
as GFCF (i.e. we assume a capitalisation factor equal to one).  
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Appendix 2.  
 
Figure A1: Industry composition of intangible investment (average 2000-2013) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest 
 
Figure A2: Intangible to tangible investment by industry (average 2000-2013) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on National Accounts 
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Figure A3: Real intangible investment growth in the industry and the service sectors 
(chain linked volumes, compounded annual average rates of growth 2000-2013) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest 
 
Figure A4: Intangible investment (%GDP) and GDP per head 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on National Accounts 
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Figure A5: Intangible over tangible investment ratio and GDP per head 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on National Accounts 
 
 
Figure A6: Intangible intensity before the crisis and the impact of the crisis 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on National Accounts 
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Figure A7: Intangible to tangible ratio before the crisis and the impact of the crisis 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on National Accounts 
 
Figure A8: Changes in the contributions to the growth of labour productivity in 18 
European countries and the United States before and since the Great Recession (averages 
2007-2013 minus averages 2000-2007) 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on National Accounts 
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Figure A9: Intangible intensity and product market regulation 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and OECD 
 
 
Figure A10: Intangible/tangible ratio and product market regulation 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and OECD 
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Figure A11: Intangible intensity (%GDP) and employment protection legislation 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and OECD 
 
Figure A12: Intangible/tangible ratio and employment protection legislation 
 
Source: INTAN-Invest and OECD 
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Table A1: Intangible investment by industry (% officially measured industry value added) 
 2000-2007 2008-2009 2010-2013 
 IND SERxL IND SERxL IND SERxL 
Austria 9.6% 8.9% 11.2% 9.1% 12.2% 9.9% 
Belgium 11.0% 10.8% 13.0% 12.1% 14.5% 13.6% 
Czech Republic 9.1% 10.5% 9.2% 11.6% 9.1% 11.3% 
Denmark 13.2% 9.5% 15.0% 10.4% 15.3% 9.7% 
Finland 15.3% 12.2% 19.5% 12.4% 20.1% 12.3% 
France 15.8% 12.4% 16.8% 13.5% 17.8% 14.2% 
Germany  12.3% 6.0% 12.6% 6.1% 12.0% 6.3% 
Greece 7.4% 5.1% 9.2% 5.6% 9.1% 6.5% 
Hungary 8.6% 10.0% 9.6% 11.0% 10.0% 10.2% 
Ireland 9.7% 11.4% 14.9% 13.4% 15.7% 13.9% 
Italy 8.9% 8.0% 9.5% 8.1% 9.9% 7.9% 
Netherlands 11.0% 11.8% 11.3% 12.4% 12.6% 12.0% 
Portugal 5.8% 11.0% 7.5% 12.4% 7.7% 11.8% 
Slovenia 10.0% 10.0% 10.7% 10.4% 12.6% 11.0% 
Spain 5.3% 6.9% 6.4% 7.5% 7.5% 8.1% 
Sweden 21.0% 13.3% 22.2% 12.9% 22.4% 12.8% 
Slovakia 5.6% 7.7% 5.8% 8.5% 6.6% 9.2% 
United Kingdom 11.3% 14.7% 11.2% 14.5% 11.5% 14.3% 
United States 13.3% 12.3% 14.6% 12.5% 15.0% 12.6% 
European Union 
(15 countries 
excl. LU) 11.5% 10.1% 12.2% 10.3% 12.7% 10.6% 
Czech Rep-
Hungary-
Slovenia-
Slovakia 8.5% 9.9% 8.8% 10.7% 9.1% 10.6% 
Source: INTAN-Invest and authors’ elaborations on National Accounts 
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Table A2: Cross-country correlation between intangible investment and firm size in EU 
countries 
 
Intangible 
share 
intangible/tangible 
ratio 
Mining and quarrying 0.12 0.18 
Manufacturing 0.48 0.45 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.09 0.19 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities -0.02 -0.04 
Construction 0.29 0.01 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.29 0.45 
Transportation and storage 0.30 0.25 
Accommodation and food service activities 0.44 0.47 
Information and communication 0.18 0.67 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.09 0.33 
Administrative and support service activities 0.25 0.26 
   
Source: INTAN-Invest, National Accounts and OECD   
Note: average firm size is measured as the share of persons employed in firms with more than 250 persons 
employed 
 
 
Table A3: Cross-country correlations between intangible investment by asset type and high-level 
economy-wide indicators of product market regulation 
 Product Market Regulations 
 PMR State control 
Barriers to 
entrepreneurship 
Barriers to trade 
and investment 
Intangible Investment (%GDP) -0.69 -0.62 -0.42 -0.53 
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Software and Databases -0.48 -0.44 -0.34 -0.32 
Innovative Property -0.60 -0.58 -0.32 -0.45 
Economic Competencies -0.46 -0.36 -0.31 -0.40 
Intangible over tangible 
Investment  -0.70 -0.54 -0.44 -0.68 
     
Source: INTAN-Invest and OECD 
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